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Determinants of Agricultural Disaster Payments in the  




Direct disaster payments are considered the least efficient form of agricultural disaster relief 
(Goodwin and Smith, 1995). Several pieces of legislation were passed in the early 1990s in an 
attempt to make the process more market oriented, in particular by tying the payments to crop 
insurance. However, disaster relief is determined on an ad hoc basis by the legislators after a 
disaster occurs. Consequently, the disaster payments have often been a substitute for insurance 
(Gardner, 1994), and the disaster payment allocation has been described as a result of rent seeking 
by interest groups (Schmitz, Furtan, and Baylis, 2002). This process is more transparent at the 
higher levels of fund allocation (Brooks, Cameron, and Carter, 1998). It has been suggested that, on 
the congressional level, legislators are pressed by organized agriculture interest groups to subsidize 
farmers who experienced a disaster. As a result, the disaster payment allocation was found to be 
less dependent on the weather and more on those socio-economic and political variables that proxy 
the lobbying power of interest groups (Garrett, Marsh, and Marshall, 2006). 
In this paper, we test a similar hypothesis on the county level. The area chosen for this 
analysis consists of crop producing counties in Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. The time period 
covers 11 years (1995-2005). In comparison to the more aggregate analysis, our local weather data 
is more representative of the unfavorable conditions causing agricultural disasters. However, as the 
process of disaster aid allocation at the county level is less transparent and, therefore good data are 
hard to obtain, the proxies for political forces that may be behind the process are less precise.    3
An agricultural disaster occurs when damages and losses due to a natural disaster amount to 
at least a 30-percent production loss of at least one crop in a county. The amount of money 
distributed as disaster payments is substantial: $25.8 billion has been distributed to 2 million 
recipients nationwide during 1985-2005. In 2006, USDA provided $250 million for crop disaster, 
livestock, tree, and aquaculture assistance through five new programs. In the Southeastern U.S., the 
aid for agricultural producers affected by hurricanes in 2005 was $2.8 billion, and disaster 
payments to farmers, ranchers and others through eight separate programs to producers in 
Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas was $1.2 billion.  
Under perfect information, agricultural disaster payments should be affected only by the 
incidence of catastrophic climate events and the losses they cause. Since it is not always possible to 
measure the exact amount of the losses that a catastrophic event creates, in the absence of perfect 
information, actual payments may be affected by non-climate factors. To address the criticisms that 
payments are biased/inequitable (e.g. Environmental Working Group reports), this study tests the 
hypothesis that both climate related and non-climate variables such as economic, political, and 
community characteristics affect distributions of disaster payments.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology used in 




Following Garret et al. (2006), annual disaster payments (by county) are modeled as a function of 
climate data such as the minimum and maximum temperature during growing season, precipitation,   4
and ENSO variables as well as socio-economic variables to proxy for producers’ lobbying potential 
to receive disaster-related payments.  Specifically, the model is   
Payacresit = f (X1it, X2it, ai,)+ uit      ( 1 )  
where Payacres is the crop disaster payments per acre, X1 contains the weather variables, and X2 
contains the socio-economic variables expected to affect county-level crop disaster payments. ai is 
the latent time-invariant variable and uit is the idiosyncratic random error. 
The methodology is dictated by the nature of the cross-sectional time series (panel) data. 
Panel data methods accommodate an unobserved (latent) time invariant variable in the 
fixed/random effect regression framework. Since Garret et al. found that disaster payments on the 
state level was affected by weather independent, and likely time invariant variables applying these 
methods using county level panel data permits estimating correctly the impact of climate variables 
even if weather  independent factors are non-observable.  
The fixed effects (FE) estimation is simply a pooled OLS on data transformed using time 
averages to eliminate the unobserved time-invariant variable assumed to be correlated with the 
regressors (such as socio-economic characteristics or lobby power). This assumption is necessary 
for efficient estimation with the FE technique. It is also plausible in the context of the problem 
addressed because possible lobby power (or other variables affecting distribution of disaster pay) 
are likely to be correlated with the climate related variables and socioeconomic variables. For 
example, farmers living in areas more prone to disasters will be more likely to organize to seek 
such payments.  
The alternative random effects (RE) estimation allows for time-invariant regressors, such as 
some socioeconomic variables available from one census data during the study period, but it is 
based on the assumption that the unobserved variable is uncorrelated with the other regressors.  The   5
FE is preferred to RE approach because RE assumes that the county-level observations are random 
draws from a large population. In addition, while it may be possible that the unobserved variables 
are uncorrelated with the weather variables, they are likely to be correlated with the census 
variables, such as farm concentration or production volumes. Empirical test of this assumption is 
done with a Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2002, Ch. 10). 
The estimation choice, however, needs to account for the fact that disaster payment data 
used in the analysis are censored – some counties receive zero payments in some years (zero 
payments comprise only 12% of the data). To accommodate this, a Tobit estimation is used. While 
the FE model is in general preferred when counties are used because it is hard to make the 
argument that the counties are drawn from a random distribution, panel data Tobit models with 
fixed effects are inconsistent. These challenges are addressed by estimating fixed effects, random 
effects and Tobit random effect and comparing the robustness of the results. Given the small 
fraction of the censored observations linear FE and RE estimation provide good approximations for 
conditional distributions of the disaster payments (model coefficients) near the mean values.  
 
3. Data Description 
Variable definitions are described in Table 1 and summary statistics are in Table 2. The data for the 
analysis come from several sources. Data on disaster payments were collected from the 
Environmental Working Group’s Farm Subsidy Database that lists county level payments for the 
period from 1995 to 2005. The payments only include crop related programs and not livestock 
related payments because the focus of the study is on the effects of weather and climate and 
livestock program payments are likely to be affected by different variables. In addition, metro 
counties and counties in the mountainous regions of Georgia and Alabama without significant crop   6
production were excluded. The counties in the analysis produce mostly cotton, peanuts, corn, and 
soybeans. The panel dataset is comprised of 65 counties in Alabama, 15 counties in Florida, and 91 
counties in Georgia, or a total of about 1,800 annual observations for the sample. 
The payments used in the analysis include Crop Disaster Program Payments, Non-Insured 
Assistance Payments, Natural Disaster Payments, Disaster Reserve Assistance Payments, Quality 
Losses Program Payments, Disaster - Quality Adjustment Payments, Disaster Supplemental 
Payments, and Disaster Assistance Payments. All the payments were adjusted for inflation using 
data from the BLS.  
In the context of this paper, the term “disaster payments” pools all of the above 
components. Some of the original annual payments (paydis) were negative (although small in 
absolute value), which was a result of excessive payments made in the previous year. The data 
were adjusted accordingly by applying the negative payments to the previous year.
1 Zero disaster 
payments constitute 12% of the data, most of which belong to 1996 and 1998 years. The per county 
crop disaster payments were divided by the total harvested crop acres in a county. The resulting per 
acre payment data (payacre) is more suitable for the analysis of the payment distribution. As Table 
2 shows, the average annual per acre disaster payment was in Florida ($25), followed by Alabama 
($14), and Georgia ($12) with all data presented in 2005 dollar equivalent. 
The weather data were collected from the Florida State University’s Center for Oceanic-
Atmospheric Prediction Studies (COAPS) database provided by the South Eastern Climate 
Consortium (SECC). The database includes daily observations on minimum and maximum daily 
temperature and (cumulative) precipitation from all weather stations in Alabama, Florida, and 
Georgia. As there are fewer stations than counties and the stations’ location is not always 
                                                 
1 Estimation results are not changed by this adjustment.   7
representative of a county, a list of weather station – county correspondence compiled by the SECC 
meteorologists was used to assign the weather observations to counties. 
As the analysis is done on relatively aggregate data (not “bottom-up” construction), the 
temperature data is used to approximate the probabilities (or incidences) of freezes and draught and 
the precipitation data are used to approximate the positive (watering) and negative (flooding) 
effects of rain. Rather than using an absolute minimum temperature, which is not representative of 
the damage caused by freezes, we constructed panel variable (per county and per year) consisting 
of the first percentile of the minimum daily temperatures for the growing and harvesting seasons 
defined as mid-March to mid-November (min1pcgs), corresponding to the major crops grown in 
the state. Table 2 contains the average temperature and for each state shows values roughly 
correspond to the below freezing points (slightly below 32F ensures frost damage). Similarly, the 
95
th percentiles of the maximum annual growing season daily temperatures (max95pc) were 
constructed to reflect possible damages from heat as well as benefits from solar radiation, necessary 
for plant growth and are shown as state averages in Table 2.  
Cumulative precipitation is calculated for the growing season and for the year in ‘000 per 
inch (rain and raings) and is also contained in Table 2. Squared cumulative precipitation is 
included to reflect the negative effect of excessive rain on crop yields (possibility of flooding). 
The ElNino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) data used for grouping the yield series was 
constructed by the SECC climatologists from FSU and UFL specifically for the purpose by 
adjusting the monthly ENSO indices to reflect the ENSO conditions prevailing during the crops’ 
growth season, not calendar time. The importance of the ENSO phases comes from the 
meteorological research findings that, in general, the weather is more variable during non-neutral 
ENSO years (LaNina and ElNino) and, in the Southeast, LaNina years are usually relatively dryer   8
and hotter. The expectation is thus that the ENSO dummies (el, la, with neutral year as basis) 
should matter for disaster payments. The 1995-2005 time period contains only 2 El Nino and 2 La 
Nina years. Apart from the ENSO dummies, we also use annual dummies. 
We did not include data on official disaster (area) declarations, number of payment 
applications, etc for two reasons. One is simultaneity: such data are likely to be endogenous (i.e., 
determined by the same variables as the payments). The other is that, even if it were not, disaster 
declaration data would be just a more precise substitute for the weather/climate data. 
Data that serve as proxies for possible lobbying or local political power of farm groups on 
the county level were collected from the disaster payment census of agriculture. The last two 
censuses were conducted only in 2002 and 1997, but that does not preclude using them in the 
analysis as the data are largely time invariant (2002 census is more complete and time relevant). 
The data can be used in the random effects panel data regressions, fixed effects panel data 
regressions when interacted with annual dummies, and in the tobit models.  
Understandably, there are no perfect indicators of the ambiguous (often alleged to be 
significant) lobbying power of various farm groups that may lead to inequitable and distorted 
distribution of agricultural payments. One of the best candidates is perhaps the disaster payment 
concentration (collected from the EWG’s Farm Subsidy Database). This variable represents the 
percentage of the total disaster payments for a county in a given year distributed to the top one 
percent of the recipients (pmt1pc), and can proxy for political (redistributive) power of the farm 
lobby (or influential/connected producers) if we assume that such power is associated with small 
groups and that these groups, apart from getting a disproportionately bigger share of the available 
disaster payments, are also capable of increasing a county payments’ total. Table 2 shows that the   9
payment concentration is highest in Alabama (25 percent), followed by Florida (18 percent), and 
Georgia (15 percent). 
County level agricultural census data include a number of socio-economic indicators that 
may approximate the “payment extracting” power of agricultural producers only to a certain extent. 
However, better data (such as perhaps data on the matching between the actual loss and the 
payment received and on the composition of the county Farm Service Agencies) are not available, 
and the span of the payment data is not long enough to use time-series analysis. Several variables 
from the 1997 and 2002 agricultural census were used. These are bigfarmshare (the share of farms 
with more than 1,000 acres, used to proxy the lobbying power and farm concentration in a county; 
harvshare (share of harvested cropland), operatorfarm (share of operators whose primary 
occupation is farming) and govpayments consisting of all government payments net of disaster 
payments per acre of harvested cropland in $1,000. 
 
4. Discussion of the results 
Tables 3 to 5 have two panels each and present the results from several regression specifications 
with weather-related and socio-economic variables as the dependent variables. In each table Panel 
A shows the results from a tobit model and Panel B shows the results from a FE and RE 
regressions. Due to possible high correlation of some of the socio-economic explanatory variables, 
to avoid multicolinearity, they are included in a step-wide fashion.  
Since some of the census variables were not available for every county, some observations 
were lost in those regressions. Both FE and Tobit models show similar results. While the FE model 
is in general preferred when counties are used because it is hard to make the argument that the 
counties are drawn from a random distribution, panel data Tobit models with fixed effects are   10
inconsistent. Thus, random effects (GLS) transformation, is used results whenever the time 
invariant census data are included. The unobserved variable is absorbed in the error term and the 
estimation involves a GLS transformation of the data followed by OLS estimation. In all our 
regressions, the random effects estimator (lambda) ranges from 0.06 to 0.20 showing that a large 
fraction of the unobserved effect is left in the error term. The residuals were also tested for serial 
correlation (possible due to weather data).
2 
There is consistency in the effects of weather and climate variables on the disaster payments 
in all three states. The minimum temperatures during the growing season reflect the 
incidence/frequency of freezes and are inversely related to the per acre disaster payments. For 
example in the state of Georgia, a one percent drop of the 5
th percentile of the minimum 
temperature is associated with about 1-1.5 dollars per acre increase in the disaster payment 
(replacing the percentile with the number of days with min temperatures below the freezing point 
produces a comparable estimate). 
Increase in the maximum temperatures is associated with larger payments. For Georgia a 
one degree increase in the 95
th percentile of the highest temperature increases the disaster payment 
by 1 to 1.5 dollars per acre, perhaps due to drought.Cumulative precipitation reduces the disaster 
payments (more rain is better, especially for rainfed crops) but the relationship is non-linear and 
concave, as evidenced by the negative squared precipitation term. The non-linearity captures 
probably of flooding brought about by too much rain. We can see that in Georgia rain improves 
yields but precipitation beyond (37.8”) is associated with higher disaster payments. Comparing this 
to the average precipitation of 47.4” suggests that, on average, the area gets more than enough 
precipitation (also, the average share or irrigated harvested cropland is 24%). 
                                                 
2 The coefficient at the AR(1) parameter was very small and negative. Fitting cross-sectional time series linear models 
using feasible GLS did not change the results.    11
However, the weather variables explain the variance in the disaster payments better in 
Georgia than in Alabama, and better in Alabama than in Florida. Table 4 shows that high 
temperature (proxy for drought) is significant in only one of the regressions for Florida. This could 
be attributed to the greater incidence of hurricane related damage (most of the counties analyzed 
are in the Florida Panhandle), whereas we did not use hurricane data.   
Among the most interesting results are those on the impact of ENSO phases. We find that in 
Georgia a La Nina year is associated with about 9 to 11 more dollars per acre compared to a neutral 
year and in Alabama with 10 to 15 more dollars. The results suggest that drier weather during the 
La Nina years affects disaster payment. We find that El Nino years are associated with decreased 
payments in Alabama (from 6 to 14 dollars per year based on several models various models) but 
no difference compared to neutral years in Georgia and Florida. In some of the regressions with 
data from Georgia, El Nino is weakly significant but it is not significant in the fixed effects 
regression. In Florida, however, ENSO phases do not seem to matter for the disaster payments, 
which is strange as the state’s weather is more affected by the ENSO due to its geographic location. 
We can only suggest that the drier La Nino years, the higher frequency of hurricanes during 
Neutral, and more floods in the El Nino years may create the ambiguity. These results should be 
interpreted with caution because of the short span of the data that covers only two El Nino and two 
La Nina years, which is compensated in part by the larger cross-sectional variation.  
The implication of these findings are that, since it has been argued that global warming will 
increase the incidence of El Nino and La Nina, one could expect that, at least in the Southeast, 
agricultural disaster payments will be affected. Given the increasing predictive power of climate 
forecasts, the results from such estimations can be used to better plan for such occurrences.   12
The disaster payment concentration data are used as a proxy for equity in payment 
distribution (EWG). We suggest two possible reasons for high payment concentration. One is the 
local character of crop failures and disastrous conditions affecting only a small number of 
producers. In this case, higher per acre payments could be associated with higher payment 
concentration. Another is the ability of a few to extract the payments. In this case, higher per acre 
payments are associated with higher concentration only if the ability to extract them also implies 
the ability to bias their allocation on the county level.  
Alternatively, disaster payment concentration could be inversely related to the disaster 
payments if an agricultural disaster, when it occurs, affects a large number of producers leading to 
a more even payment distribution but, when the disaster incidence is small, only a few producers 
get the payments (for one reason or another), hence the higher payment concentration. In light of 
this, even the data on chronic disaster aid recipients cited by the EWG is not a strong indicator of 
unfair play. Our results show that the indicator of payment concentration used in the analysis (the 
% of total received by the top 1 percent of the recipients), not significant in Georgia and Florida 
negative and significant in Alabama. This suggest that the observed high payment concentration is 
not associated with the total amount of payments received by a county, i.e., the “appropriative” 
power of the top payment recipients does not affect apportioning of disaster assistance to the 
counties. 
The indicators of farm concentration, the share of big farms and the average farm size (a 
proxy for the power of farm groups) matter for the disaster payments only in Alabama. Only the 
share of harvested land in the total cropland, a proxy for the intensity of the cropland usage, is 
marginally significant in Florida.    13
These results suggest that the weather and climate related factors alone explain most of the 
crop disaster payments at the county level while socioeconomic variables do not. Therefore, while 
there might be discrepancies in disaster fund allocations at state level, at the county level, it is 
distributed according to actual damage.  
In summary, the results indicate that, in Alabama and Georgia but not in Florida, weather 
and climate variables explain a relatively large portion of the variation in the disaster payments. 
The significance ENSO phases may be important for disaster budget planning, as the phases are 
predictable with high confidence levels. Contrary to the countrywide study which found that non-
weather related factors also affected distribution of agricultural disaster payments and that lobbying 
power and congressional committee representation mattered, we found only a limited impact of 
non-weather related factors on the county level in the analysis of the three Southeastern states. 
Many of the census variables described in the data section were experimented with but only a few 
were found significant. Considering this, and the state level differences in the estimation results, it 
is premature to conclude at this point whether there is any effect of lobbying and political 
preferences on the disaster payments at county level.  
One of the reasons for lack of significance in socioeconomic variables is a possible 
selection bias: the counties were selected for analysis on the basis of their agricultural production 
volume (i.e., main crop producers in the state) because of insufficiency and sketchy character of the 
data on small producers. However, crop disaster payments are non-negative in counties with even 
little agricultural production. It is more likely that payments to counties with little production are 
more dependent on farm size distribution, payment concentration, and other socioeconomic 
variables. Exclusion of these small producers may have downplayed the importance of payment 
structure and farm concentration. We plan to extend the analysis by including more counties.   14
5. Conclusions 
Using county level data we study if weather and climate variables or variables used as proxies for 
rent-seeking behavior determine disaster payment in the Southeast. The most important observation 
is that the weather variables (temperature and precipitation) are highly significant. Moreover, the 
ElNino Southern Oscillation phase dummies explain a large portion of the variation in the crop 
disaster payments. The socio-economic variables originally hypothesized to serve as proxies for 
lobbying power of farm groups and other rent-seeking behavior are significant only in Alabama bu 
have opposite to the expected sign. However, the variances of the time-invariant error components 
suggest that county effects not described by the census of agriculture variables are also significant 
in Georgia: both fixed and random effects models show greater relative significance of the latent 
time-invariant variable suggesting that the “behind the scenes” forces affecting disaster payment 
distribution on the county level may be present. However, the results neither support nor negate the 
existing criticisms of inequitable distribution of agricultural disaster payments but they suggest that 
future exploration of this topic with better data is warranted. 
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 Table 1 Variables Definition 
 
Weather and climate variables:  
Min1pc  1th percentile of min annual temperature, F 
max5pc  5th percentile of max annual temperature, F 
rain  cumulative annual precipitation, HI 
rain2  cumulative annual precipitation squared 
El  Dummy for ElNino years   
La  Dummy for LaNina years   
d95 … d05  Dummies for years   
    
Dependent variables:     
payacres  crop disaster payments/total harvested cropland acres, pure $ 
    
Socio-Economic variables:    
pmnt1pc  % of disaster payments received 
by the top 1% of recipients 
proxies the "equity" of payment 
distribution  
bigfarmshare  # of farms with >1,000 acres/# of 
farms in county 
proxies the lobbying power and 
farm concentration in a county 
govpmts  all government payments per farm, $1,000 
Operatorfarm  share of farm operators with principal occupation "farming"   16
Table 2 Summary Statistics 
Variable State  Obs  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
payacres (2005$)  AL  726  13.81 19.75 0 111.74 
 FL  180  24.98 32.89 0 176.28 
 GA  1001  12.36 15.36 0 109.24 
min1pcgs AL  698  25.94 4.31 11 38 
 FL  177  32.29 4.28 0 41 
 GA  994  29.25 3.77 16 39 
max95pcgs AL  698  94.22 2.83 82 103 
 FL  177  94.48 2.36 84 101 
 GA  994  93.36 4.32 80 99 
rain AL  698  5.59 1.14 1.24 10.22 
 FL  177  5.38 1.43 1.70 8.98 
 GA  994  0.05 0.01 0.01 0.08 
raings AL  698  4.16 1.02 0.94 8.77 
 FL  177  4.31 1.23 1.02 7.55 
 GA  994  3.64 0.88 0.77 6.21 
El AL  726  0.18 0.39 0 1 
 FL  180  0.18 0.39 0 1 
 GA    994  0.18 0.39 0 1 
La AL  726  0.18 0.39 0 1 
 FL  180  0.18 0.38 0 1 
 GA  1001  0.18 0.39 0 1 
pmt1pc AL  108  20.46 7.67 6 40 
 FL  45  18.42 5.68 9 31 
 GA  152  15.01 6.42 0 36 
bigfarmshare AL  726  0.04 0.04 0.0031 0.1471 
 FL  180  0.03 0.02 0.0077 0.0728 
 GA  1001  0.07 0.06 0.0024 0.2653 
harvshare AL  726  0.49 0.12 0.2771 0.7834 
 FL  180  0.54 0.11 0.3607 0.7947 
 GA  1001  0.69 0.15 0.3570 0.9111 
govpmts AL  726  1.87 1.60 0.1053 7.6012 
 FL  180  1.63 1.72 0.2442 6.9272 
 GA  990  3.93 3.38 0.0424 14.5092 
   17
Table 3. Panel A: Results from a tobit regressions for Alabama 
The dependent variable is payment per acre 
  (1) (2) (4) (3) 
min1pcgs -0.713  -0.476  -0.451  -0.856 
 (2.88)***  (2.23)**  (2.21)**  (3.98)*** 
max95pc  0.464 2.249 2.095 0.218 
 (5.31)***  (6.23)***  (5.98)***  (1.50) 
rain -6.381  -10.400  -10.177  -9.923 
  (4.00)*** (5.54)*** (5.52)*** (5.26)*** 
raings2  1.359 1.573 1.540 1.585 
  (6.62)*** (6.51)*** (6.51)*** (6.58)*** 
el   -14.872  -14.785  -14.565 
    (6.29)*** (6.30)*** (6.18)*** 
la   15.351  14.885  8.471 
    (5.77)*** (5.76)*** (3.42)*** 
pmt1pc  -0.314     
  (2.68)***     
bigfarmshare   72.282  79.513 
   (2.39)**    (2.95)*** 
govpmts   1.530  3.571   
   (2.21)**  (6.26)***   
harvshare     -35.086   
     (4.91)***  
operatorfarm       62.470 
       (3.02)*** 
County dummies  yes      yes 
      
Year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
      
Constant   232.117  234.286   
   (6.73)***  (6.99)***   
Observations  106 698 698 698 
Number of countyn  54  65  65  65 
sigma_u  2.53  3.37 .51 4.15 
  1.51 2.37 0.07 3.07 
sigma_e  7.35  19.98 19.95 20.32 
  10.25 32.14 32.21 32.03 
rho 0.10  .027  .0007  .04 
      
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3. Panel B: Results from FE and RE regressions for Alabama 
The dependent variable is payment per acre  
 FE  MLE  (RE)  RE  RE 
min1pcgs  -0.522  -0.705 -0.308 -0.333 
 (2.45)**  (2.86)***  (1.75)*  (1.81)* 
max95pc  1.577  0.459 1.338 1.446 
  (4.40)***  (5.28)*** (4.49)*** (4.70)*** 
rain  -7.264  -6.297 -6.074 -6.061 
  (4.23)***  (3.97)*** (3.86)*** (3.78)*** 
raings2  0.932  1.350 0.939 0.936 
  (4.33)***  (6.62)*** (4.69)*** (4.58)*** 
el -5.615    -6.229  -6.154 
 (3.01)***    (3.36)***  (3.30)*** 
la 9.771    10.990  11.284 
 (3.87)***    (4.78)***  (4.79)*** 
pmt1pc   -0.316     
   (2.72)***     
harvshare    -31.979   
     (5.13)***   
govpmts     3.259  1.527 
     (6.53)***  (2.58)*** 
bigfarmshare      55.260 
      (2.13)** 
County dummies    Yes     
       
Year dummies  Yes  yes  Yes  yes 
       
Constant 170.928    156.588  151.176 
 (4.90)***    (5.53)***  (5.17)*** 
sigma_u 7.49  2.31  0  2.51 
sigma_e 18.09  7.37  18.09  18.09 
rho 0.15  0.09  0  0.02 
Observations 698  106 698 698 
R-squared  0.14     
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   19
Table 4. Panel A: Results from tobit regressions for Florida 
The dependent variable is payment per acre  
 FE  MLE 
(RE) 
RE RE 
min1pcgs 0.969  -0.014  1.229  1.197 
 (1.71)*  (0.01)  (2.31)**  (2.21)** 
max95pc -0.091  0.713  -0.468  -0.353 
 (0.08)  (1.23)  (0.45)  (0.33) 
rain -0.026  -0.011  -0.024  -0.024 
 (5.53)***  (1.46)  (5.26)***  (5.25)*** 
raings2 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (5.15)***  (1.63)  (4.97)***  (4.95)*** 
el -6.418    -6.762  -6.674 
 (1.10)    (1.16)  (1.15) 
la -4.879    -5.514  -5.462 
 (0.84)    (0.95)  (0.94) 
pmt1pc   -0.874     
   (1.39)     
harvshare     -101.637   
     (1.85)*   
govpmts     3.537  -1.918 
     (0.99)  (0.79) 
bigfarmshare       -40.973 
       (0.19) 
County dummies    yes     
        
Year dummies  yes  yes  yes  Yes 
        
Constant 79.762    149.475  95.242 
 (0.80)    (1.48)  (0.97) 
sigma_u 13.1  0  7.79  9.67 
sigma_e 28.44  21.88445  28.44  28.44 
rho .17  0  .069  .10 
Observations 177  43  177  177 
Number of county  15  15  15  15 
R-squared 0.23      
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   20
Table 4. Panel B: Results from FE and RE regressions for Florida 
The dependent variable is payment per acre  
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
min1pcgs  -0.014  -1.805 -1.803 -1.711 
  (0.01) (2.52)** (2.56)** (2.50)** 
max95pc  0.713  0.030 0.184 0.680 
  (1.23)  (0.02) (0.15) (2.20)** 
rain  -0.011  -0.035 -0.035 -0.036 
  (1.46)  (6.13)*** (6.11)*** (6.59)*** 
raings2  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (1.63)  (5.73)*** (5.74)*** (6.12)*** 
el    -5.004 -5.060 -4.988 
    (0.75) (0.76) (0.75) 
la    -6.668 -6.420 -6.218 
    (0.97) (0.94) (0.91) 
pmt1pc  -0.874     
  (1.39)     
bigfarmshare   -110.636    -147.774 
   (0.47)    (0.86) 
govpmts  -1.370  3.832   
    (0.52) (0.99)  
harvshare     -105.481   
     (1.77)*   
principaloperatorbyp
rimaryoccupa 
     
0.036 
      (2.01)** 
County  dummies  yes    Yes 
       
Year  dummies  Yes  yes yes Yes 
       
Constant  73.652  132.245   
    (0.65) (1.14)  
sigma_u  0.00  9.61 7.78 7.77 
  (0.00)  (2.61) (2.04) (2.09) 
sigma_e  21.88  31.95 31.90 31.97 
  (9.27)  (15.82) (15.85) (15.84) 
rho  0  .08 .05 .055 
       
Observations  43  177 177 177 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   21
Table 5. Panel A: Results from tobit regressions for Georgia. 
The dependent variable is payment per acre  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
min1pcgs  -3.194 -1.274 -1.203 -1.305 
  (4.42)*** (7.48)*** (7.22)*** (7.59)*** 
max5pc  3.425 0.314 0.099 0.401 
 (6.04)***  (1.95)*  (0.76)  (2.37)** 
rain  -2.359 -0.534 -0.886 -0.529 
  (2.71)*** (1.93)* (3.87)*** (1.92)* 
rain2  0.023 0.005 0.008 0.005 
  (2.61)*** (1.45) (2.98)*** (1.43) 
el   0.447  0.665  0.411 
   (0.29)  (0.43)  (0.27) 
la   11.196  10.975  11.125 
   (7.41)***  (7.27)***  (7.37)*** 
pmt1pc -0.007       
 (0.03)       
bigfarmshare   10.581  -4.703   
   (0.53)  (0.43)  
govpmts   -0.422  -0.038 
   (1.25)  (0.14) 
harvshare       -8.680 
       (1.35) 
operatorfarm     -17.091   
     (1.87)*   
County  dummies  Yes  Yes  
      
Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant   -29.443  -29.618 
   (2.92)***  (2.96)*** 
sigma_u  8.74 3.21 3.12 3.24 
  3.76 3.66 3.58 3.74 
sigma_e  13.41 16.03 16.08 16.01 
  10.13 36.63 36.85 36.65 
rho .29  .03  .03  0.04 
      
Observations  152 983 994 983 
Number of counties  78  90  91  90 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   22
 
Table 5. Panel B: Results from FE and RE regressions for Georgia 
The dependent variable is payment per acre  
 FE  MLE 
(RE) 
RE RE RE 
min1pcgs  -0.947 -3.305 -0.863 -0.873 -0.900 
  (6.09)*** (4.67)*** (6.17)*** (6.17)*** (6.34)*** 
max5pc  0.938 3.466 0.448 0.457 0.507 
  (4.98)*** (6.23)*** (3.35)*** (3.43)*** (3.61)*** 
rain  -0.444 -2.258 -0.478 -0.487 -0.481 
 (1.81)*  (2.65)***  (2.04)**  (2.07)**  (2.06)** 
rain2  0.005 0.022 0.004 0.004 0.004 
  (1.63) (2.55)**  (1.51) (1.56) (1.51) 
el  1.587   2.522 2.363 2.505 
 (1.26)    (2.03)**  (1.89)*  (2.02)** 
la  9.905   9.502 9.664 9.416 
  (7.65)***   (7.43)*** (7.50)*** (7.36)*** 
pmt1pc   -0.051     
   (0.23)     
harvshare      -8.531 
      (2.03)** 
govpmts     -0.292   
     (1.66)*   
bigfarmshare    -15.081    
    (1.53)    
County  Dummies   Yes     
       
Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant  -54.531   -23.308 -23.996 -22.559 
  (4.37)***   (2.76)*** (2.84)*** (2.72)*** 
sigma_u  6.37 8.94 3.19 3.17 3.18 
sigma_e  13.64 12.89 13.64 13.67 13.64 
rho  .17 .32 .05 .05 .05 
Observations  994 152 994 983 994 
Number  of  counties  91 78 91 90 91 
R-squared  0.17      
Robust  t  statistics  in  parentheses        
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      
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